9 research outputs found

    Une réponse pragmatiste à la tension entre les notions d'individu et de population dans le cadre des théories de l'évolution darwinienne

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    Dans le cadre d’explications darwiniennes, il est nécessaire de référer minimalement à deux niveaux d’organisation biologique, soit celui de l’individu et celui de la population. Dans ce mémoire, nous cherchons à fournir des outils pour distinguer ces deux niveaux et, du même coup, ces deux concepts. À la lumière des travaux de Millstein (2010b) et de la conception de l’individualité défendue par Hull (1978) et Ghiselin (1974), nous proposons un continuum de l’individualité pensé en termes d’intégration sur lequel se situent les individus et les populations. Les populations sont associées à un faible degré d’intégration alors que les individus présentent un degré d’intégration élevé. En adoptant la méthodologie des paramètres gradients de Godfrey-Smith (2009b), la distinction catégorique entre les deux concepts est repensée comme étant une distinction graduelle. Dans ce mémoire, nous explorons les fondements pragmatistes de cette méthode et argumentons pour son utilisation en philosophie de la biologie.Darwinian explanations require the distinction between two levels of biological organisation, that of the individual and that of the population. This research aims at identifying tools to distinguish these two levels and the related concepts. Building on Millstein’s work concerned with the notion of population (2010b) and on the theory of individuality defended by Hull (1978) and Ghiselin (1974), we propose a continuum of individuality understood in terms of integration and on which figure both populations and individuals. The population concept is associated with a low degree of integration, while the notion of individuality refers to a high degree. Such a continuum of individuality relies on a specific philosophical standpoint associated with Godfrey-Smith’s gradient parameters methodology (2009b). Our research will explore the pragmatist foundations of this methodology in order to argue for its use in philosophy of biology

    Cohérentisme historique et pratiques classificatoires : la phylogénétique contemporaine comme cas d'étude

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    L’objectif de cette thĂšse est de fournir un cadre thĂ©orique pour l’analyse philosophique des pratiques classificatoires en sciences. La classification, dĂ©finie comme Ă©tant un geste Ă©pistĂ©mique dont l’objectif est de fournir une description du monde par dĂ©coupage et discrimination, et par mise en relation des catĂ©gories ainsi formĂ©es, est un point de rencontre naturel entre philosophie et sciences. La tradition des espĂšces naturelles, considĂ©rĂ©e en philosophie des sciences comme la principale approche disponible pour l’analyse des pratiques classificatoires, est toutefois lacunaire. Dans le cadre de cette thĂšse, je dĂ©montre les faiblesses de cette approche et le besoin de mobiliser d’autres ressources Ă©pistĂ©mologiques pour penser la classification. À cet effet, je m’inspire de travaux en philosophie de la mesure s’inscrivant dans un courant de pensĂ©e que j’appelle le cohĂ©rentisme historique. Ces approches mettent l’accent sur les pratiques infĂ©rentielles et sur la charge thĂ©orique des observations en plus d’insister sur le dynamisme scientifique et la multitude de facteurs qui l’influencent (principe de respect, impĂ©ratif de progrĂšs, dĂ©veloppements thĂ©oriques, nouveaux outils [mathĂ©matiques ou matĂ©riels], nouvelles donnĂ©es, histoire du champ disciplinaire, structure sociale de la recherche, etc.). Une fois ce cadre d’analyse Ă©pistĂ©mologique prĂ©sentĂ© en dĂ©tail, je le mobilise pour Ă©tudier un ensemble de pratiques classificatoires en sciences, soit les pratiques phylogĂ©nĂ©tiques contemporaines. La phylogĂ©nĂ©tique est la discipline biologique qui vise Ă  retracer les liens gĂ©nĂ©alogiques qui unissent les ĂȘtres vivants. Les gĂšnes et organismes sont ainsi regroupĂ©s au sein d’unitĂ©s taxonomiques qui sont par la suite mises en relation. Ce champ disciplinaire a longtemps Ă©tĂ© associĂ© de façon intime et exclusive au modĂšle arborescent, lui-mĂȘme associĂ© Ă  la thĂ©orie de l’évolution par voie de sĂ©lection naturelle : les liens phylogĂ©nĂ©tiques entre organismes sont gĂ©nĂ©ralement reprĂ©sentĂ©s sous la forme d’un arbre, soit l’Arbre du vivant. Or, les derniĂšres dĂ©cennies ont vu Ă©merger, au sein de la discipline, un compĂ©titeur : le modĂšle rĂ©ticulĂ©. En analysant les diffĂ©rences et similaritĂ©s qui lient ces deux types de modĂšles (modĂšles arborescents et modĂšles rĂ©seaux), je dĂ©montre que la transition d’un modĂšle Ă  l’autre n’influence que superficiellement la pratique puisque la majoritĂ© de ses dĂ©terminants demeure inchangĂ©e. En bref, cette thĂšse prĂ©sente un cadre d’analyse philosophique pour apprĂ©hender les pratiques classificatoires en sciences. J’importe des principes et des outils issus de travaux de la philosophie de la mesure afin de dĂ©velopper une philosophie de la classification qui comble les lacunes de la tradition des espĂšces naturelles. En s’ancrant dans ce que j’appelle le cohĂ©rentisme historique, cette thĂšse contribue non seulement Ă  la bonne comprĂ©hension des pratiques classificatoires d’un point de vue Ă©pistĂ©mologique, mais aussi Ă  la bonne comprĂ©hension des pratiques phylogĂ©nĂ©tiques contemporaines et de l’importante transition qui Ă©loigne cette discipline de son modĂšle classique, soit l’Arbre du vivant.The main objective of this dissertation is to offer a philosophical framework for the analysis of scientific classificatory practices. Classification, here defined as an epistemic action that describes the world by breaking down phenomena into categories and by establishing relevant relationships between these categories, is a natural bridge between philosophy and science. The tradition of natural kinds, which is currently the main approach in philosophy of science for analysing classificatory practices, has important shortcomings when it comes to epistemologically analyzing scientific classification. In this dissertation, I highlight these weaknesses and the consequent need to develop a novel framework for tackling classificatory practices. To achieve this, I draw on an existing trend in philosophy of measurement, which I coined historical coherentism. This approach is centered on the analysis of inferential practices and stresses the importance of the theoretical charge of observations. It also focuses on the dynamic nature of scientific fields and on the variety of factors that determine scientific progress (principle of respect, imperative of progress, theoretical developments, mathematical and material innovations, new data, the history of a field of research, the social structure of the scientific community, etc.). After the detailed presentation and exploration of this epistemological framework, I use it to tackle a set of scientific classificatory practices, namely contemporary phylogenetic practices. Phylogenetics is the biological discipline that aims to reconstruct the genealogical relationships uniting living beings. Genes and organisms are grouped into operative taxonomic units, and these units are then connected within a system. Since its inception, phylogenetics has been intimately tied to tree-based models, with these tree-based models themselves tied to the theory of evolution by means of natural selection: the phylogenetic system connecting all living organisms takes the form of a tree, the Tree of Life. In the last few decades, however, an alternative type of models has gained more attention and support within the field: network-based models. Using historical coherentism, I analyze the differences and similarities between the two competing types of models (tree-based models and network-based models) and show that the transition from one to the other only superficially changes phylogenetic practices. Indeed, many factors that constrain these practices remain unchanged whether researchers use tree-based or network-based models. In short, this thesis presents a philosophical framework for the analysis of classificatory practices in sciences. I use various principles and tools imported from the philosophy of measurement to develop a philosophy of classification that covers the weaknesses of the tradition of natural kinds. By anchoring my work in historical coherentism, I contribute not only to our understanding of classificatory practices, from an epistemological perspective, but also to a better understanding of contemporary phylogenetic practices and of the significant transition that leads this discipline away from its classical model, the Tree of Life

    Quality control of CarboEurope flux data - Part I: Footprint analyses to evaluate sites in forest ecosystems

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    We applied a site evaluation approach combining Lagrangian Stochastic footprint modelling with a quality assessment approach for eddy-covariance data to 25 forested sites of the CarboEurope-IP network. The analysis addresses the spatial representativeness of the flux measurements, instrumental effects on data quality, spatial patterns in the data quality, and the performance of the coordinate rotation method. Our findings demonstrate that application of a footprint filter could strengthen the CarboEurope-IP flux database, since only one third of the sites is situated in truly homogeneous terrain. Almost half of the sites experience a significant reduction in eddy-covariance data quality under certain conditions, though these effects are mostly constricted to a small portion of the dataset. Reductions in data quality of the sensible heat flux are mostly induced by characteristics of the surrounding terrain, while the latent heat flux is subject to instrumentation-related problems. The Planar-Fit coordinate rotation proved to be a reliable tool for the majority of the sites using only a single set of rotation angles. Overall, we found a high average data quality for the CarboEurope-IP network, with good representativeness of the measurement data for the specified target land cover types.ISSN:1810-6277ISSN:1810-628

    Sectoral approaches to improve regional carbon budgets

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    Humans utilise about 40% of the earth’s net primary production (NPP) but the products of this NPP are often managed by different sectors, with timber and forest products managed by the forestry sector and food and fibre products from croplands and grasslands managed by the agricultural sector. Other significant anthropogenic impacts on the global carbon cycle include human utilization of fossil fuels and impacts on less intensively managed systems such as peatlands, wetlands and permafrost. A great deal of knowledge, expertise and data is available within each sector. We describe the contribution of sectoral carbon budgets to our understanding of the global carbon cycle. Whilst many sectors exhibit similarities for carbon budgeting, some key differences arise due to differences in goods and services provided, ecology, management practices used, landmanagement personnel responsible, policies affecting land management, data types and availability, and the drivers of change. We review the methods and data sources available for assessing sectoral carbon budgets, and describe some of key data limitations and uncertainties for each sector in different regions of the world. We identify the main gaps in our knowledge/data, show that coverage is better for the developed world for most sectors, and suggest how sectoral carbon budgets could be improved in the future. Research priorities include the development of shared protocols through site networks, a move to full carbon accounting within sectors, and the assessment of full greenhouse gas budgets
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